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Torts-SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA RULES
THAT PLANNING/OPERATIONAL DICHOTOMY NOT APPLICABLE UNDER
LIABILITY INSURANCE STATUTE-Avallone v. Board of County
Commissioners, 493 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 1986)
N 1953 the Florida Legislature enacted a statute partially waiv-
ing sovereign immunity.' Currently, the statute allows political
subdivisions of the state to purchase liability insurance for dam-
ages caused by certain activities. 2 Once purchased, the liability in-
surer cannot assert the defense of sovereign immunity; it is waived
to the extent of policy coverage.3 For over thirty years, however,
the statute's importance "has been generally overlooked.' 4 Since
the enactment in 1973 of a statute broadly waiving sovereign im-
munity,5 Florida courts have had the opportunity to reexamine the
policy underlying the sovereign immunity doctrine.6 This led inevi-
tably to a review of the old limited-waiver statute through the
courts' newly refined sovereign immunity lens. The confrontation
finally occurred when Avallone v. Board of County Commission-
ers 7 came before the Fifth District Court of Appeal, and later, the
Florida Supreme Court. Yet it is not clear whether the most recent
judicial vision of sovereign immunity provides a more lucid view
than the old statute's blurry construction.
In this Note, the author follows the Avallone case through the
appellate and supreme courts. The author then reviews the histori-
cal construction of section 286.28, Florida Statutes as well as the
role given to the broad waiver of sovereign immunity statute, sec-
tion 768.28, Florida Statutes. Finally, the author discusses the im-
pact of the new statute on the old and reexamines the Avallone
decision to assess the old statute's role in the overall sovereign im-
munity scheme.
I. AVALLONE V. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
The plaintiff, Gloria Jean Avallone, brought a tort action against
Citrus County for injuries she sustained when she was pushed off a
dock at a county-owned and operated park.6 She contended that
1. Ch. 53-28220, 1953 Fla. Laws 791 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 286.28 (1985)).
2. See FLA. STAT. § 286.28 (1985).
3. Id.
4. Everton v. Willard, 468 So. 2d 936, 952 n.16. (Fla. 1985) (Shaw, J., dissenting).
5. Ch. 73-313, 1973 Fla. Laws 711 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1985).
6. See infra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
7. 467 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), rev'd, 493 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 1986).
8. Avallone, 467 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
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the county had a duty to provide supervisory personnel but failed
to do so. The trial court granted a summary judgment for the
Board of County Commissioners, finding the injury was the result
of an independent intervening cause.9 Avallone appealed, and the
Board cross-appealed, claiming that whether to provide supervi-
sory personnel at the park was a "discretionary, planning-level de-
cision"10 and "absolute immunity attaches for planning-level activ-
ities of government .... [T]he immunity for such . . . activity is
not altered or affected by the fact that the Board has purchased
liability insurance. '
The Fifth District Court of Appeal agreed with the Board, not-
ing that its decision in Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River
County"2 required a distinction between two aspects of the sover-
eign immunity doctrine:
[Commercial Carrier] distinguished between that part of the sov-
ereign immunity doctrine involving negligent tortious conduct
waived by section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1977), and that part
of the sovereign immunity doctrine identified at times as official
or governmental immunity not waived by the statute. In the lat-
ter, absolute immunity attaches to "policymaking, planning, or
judgmental governmental functions." The underlying premise for
this immunity is that it cannot be tortious conduct for govern-
ment to govern. Our decision recognized that there are areas in-
herent in the act of governing which cannot be subject to suit and
scrutiny by judge or jury without violating the separation of pow-
ers doctrine.' s
The court then noted that section 286.28, Florida Statutes, author-
izing political subdivisions to purchase liability insurance and pro-
viding for a waiver of sovereign immunity to the extent of cover-
age, had been in existence long before section 768.28, the more
expansive waiver statute construed in Commercial Carrier. The
court stated that while the older statute had been held to remain
in effect as part of the overall statutory scheme waiving sovereign
immunity,14 it contained no language eliminating absolute immu-
9. Id. at 827.
10. Id. The appellants did not contest this finding on appeal. Id.
11. Id.
12. 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
13. Avallone, 467 So. 2d at 827 (quoting Commerical Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1020) (em-
phasis added by the court) (citations omitted).
14. The court cited Ingraham v. Dade County School Bd., 450 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1984), for
that proposition.
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nity where "planning level" activities are concerned: "As-does sec-
tion 768.28 now, before its adoption section 286.28 merely elimi-
nated the immunity which prevented recovery for existing common
law torts committed by the government. If section 768.28 does not
alter this absolute immunity, neither does section 286.28. "18
Avallone was reviewed by the Florida Supreme Court,16 which
found it in "direct and express" conflict with Ingraham v. Dade
County School Board.17 The court explicitly disagreed with the
lower court's holding that section 286.28 did not waive sovereign
immunity in the area of planning-level activities.1 8 Unfortunately,
the majority failed to provide a clear explanation for that disagree-
ment. The court first cited the Ingraham case, in which it held
that section 286.28 functions as part of the overall legislative
scheme abrogating sovereign immunity. Then the court said that
the "thrust" of the statute is to "prohibit the assertion of sovereign
immunity to the extent of the coverage, even if it is otherwise a
valid defense."1 9 The court then merely reiterated its conclusions.2
The decision was clearly controversial; Justices Shaw"1 and Ehr-
lich 22 filed concurring opinions while both Chief Justice McDon-
ald2s and Justice Boyd 24 dissented. Of the separate opinions filed,
perhaps the most instructive on the analytical conflicts involved
was Chief Justice McDonald's dissent. McDonald essentially
agreed with the court of appeal; section 286.28, like section 768.28,
waives immunity only for operational-level decisions and not plan-
ning-level functions2 5 He argued that the planning/operational di-
chotomy "has become settled law throughout the state," and that
"the majority's ruling creates chaos out of relative order."2 Also,
15. Avallone, 467 So. 2d at 827 (citations omitted). The court pointed out two functions
retained by the statute under such an analysis. It could act as a means by which political
subdivisions could pay liability claims and could increase the liability ceiling of section
768.28(5). Id. at 828.
16. Avallone v. Board of County Comm'rs, 493 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 1986).
17. 450 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1984).
18. Avallone, 493 So. 2d at 1003.
19. Id. at 1004. The court's policy argument was that the public should benefit from a
public expenditure. Id.
20. Id. The remainder of the majority opinion disposed of the argument for waiver of
sovereign immunity under section 768.28, Florida Statutes as applied to the facts of the
case.
21. Id. at 1005 (Shaw, J., concurring specially).
22. Id. at 1006 (Ehrlich, J., concurring in result only).
23. Id. at 1007 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 1011 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 1008 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
26. Id.
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the majority interpretation penalizes entities for obtaining liability
coverage and thus discourages them from doing so. The Chief Jus-
tice contended that the legislative history of section 768.28 war-
rants interpreting section 286.28 as waiving immunity only for op-
erational-level decisions. Section 768.28 originally contained a
provision waiving all limitations to the extent of preexisting cover-
age that was subsequently deleted.17 This deletion, the Chief Jus-
tice argued, illustrates the legislature's intent to avoid waiving sov-
ereign immunity to the extent of liability coverage for planning
level functions.26 Chief Justice McDonald's dissent, the Fifth Dis-
trict Court's opinion, as well as earlier constructions of the statute
argue strongly against the majority view.
II. SECTION 286.28, FLORIDA STATUTES
Section 286.28 was enacted in 1953 and was originally codified at
section 455.06, Florida Statutes.2 9 The statute has not changed
substantially since its enactment but has become less restrictive.30
Nevertheless, that courts generally construe it very narrowly is evi-
dent in Arnold v. Shumpert.31 This case involved an action against
Orange County arising out of a malfunctioning traffic signal. The
Florida Supreme Court held that the county could assert sovereign
immunity as a defense, even though it had liability insurance pur-
suant to section 455.06, Florida Statutes. Citing the principle that
" 'waiver[s of sovereign immunity] must be clear and unequivo-
cal,'"32 the court stated that section 455.06 was not broad enough
to cover the maintenance of traffic signals. Although the court re-
viewed amendments to section 455.06 and noted its widening
scope, 3 it held that traffic lights were simply not the kind of prop-
erty covered by the current statute.
27. Id.
28. Id. The rest of the dissent is dedicated to a discussion of whether the placement of
supervisory personnel in a park is a planning or operational level decision. Id. at 1008-11.
29. FLA. STAT. § 455.06 (1953); See supra note 1.
30. Compare FLA. STAT. § 455.06(1)(1953)(restricting coverage to political subdivisions
that "own or lease and operate motor vehicles") with FLA. STAT. § 286.28(1)(1985)(including
leasing and operation of watercraft or aircraft, owning and leasing of buildings or properties,
and the performance of "operations" in the state or elsewhere).
31. 217 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1968).
32. Id. at 120 (quoting Spangler v. Florida State Turnpike Auth., 106 So. 2d 421, 424
(Fla. 1958)).
33. Arnold, 217 So. 2d at 118-19. Cf. Buffkin v. Board of County Comm'rs, 320 So. 2d
876 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (holding that the statutory langtiage was broad enough to encom-
pass negligent maintenance of a county-owned drainage ditch and distinguishing Arnold on
its facts).
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In Valdez v. State Road Department,34 the Second District
Court of Appeal held that the statute would not allow an action
against the state by a prisoner injured by a state-owned and in-
sured motor vehicle. Taking an extremely narrow view of section
455.06, the court stated that unless the legislature specifically au-
thorized such an action it was not available3 5 as the general waiver
in section 455.06 was not sufficient to do so. The court relied in
part upon Jones v. Scofield Bros. Inc., 6 in which a Maryland stat-
ute very similar to section 455.06 was construed:
The effect of indemnifying insurance taken out by State agencies
or eleemosynary corporations not otherwise liable in tort suits,
has been discussed in some cases. The generally prevailing view
seems to be that its mere existence is not sufficient to create lia-
bility ... unless the legislative enactments creat[ing] the agency
or corporation considered as a whole, lead[s] to the conclusion
that it was the intention of the Legislature to impose such liabil-
ity on the agency or corporation.37
The court went on to note Florida state decisions supporting its
position.
The statute was also strictly construed in Spaulding v. Florida
Gas Co. s In Spaulding, the First District Court of Appeal held
that where the Department of Transportation incorporated a pro-
vision for indemnity in its standard contract specifications, and the
contractor charged with constructing a road procured insurance to
cover its liability for indemnification, the Department did not
waive its immunity.3 9 The court also reiterated the principles
stated in Valdez concerning the strict construction of sovereign
immunity waiver statutes.
Baugher v. Alachua County0 is a case that arguably strictly
construes the statute. The plaintiff's decedent was murdered by a
fellow prisoner in the county jail. Although the county had liability
insurance pursuant to section 455.06, the court refused to find it
liable, reasoning that while "the defendant county has a duty to
34. 189 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966).
35. Id. at 824.
36. 73 F. Supp. 395 (D. Md. 1947).
37. Valdez, 189 So. 2d at 824 (quoting Jones, 73 F. Supp. at 398).
38. 249 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971).
39. Id. at 696. The opinion emphasized that the indemnity agreement was a "minor pro-
vision of a contract concerned with the singular purpose of constructing a road." Id.
40. 305 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).
19871
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construct and provide funds for the operation of the jail" it is the
duty of the sheriff to decide where to put prisoners.' In so holding
the court noted: "The mere procurement of insurance under Sec-
tion 455.06(2), Florida Statutes, while serving as a waiver of sover-
eign immunity does not have the effect of establishing liability.
The commission of a tort must first be shown."'
42
Surette v. Galiardo4s has been called "[p]erhaps the most liberal
reading of the statute."' 4 In Surette, a youngster was struck and
killed by a car while waiting at a school bus stop. The child's
mother brought an action against the school board alleging that it
was negligent for establishing a bus stop site in a dangerous loca-
tion.4'5 The trial court granted a directed verdict for the defendant
holding the statute inapplicable. On appeal, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal focused on the specific language of the statute.
The court distinguished Arnold v. Shumpert because it involved
"property" (a traffic light) to which the more restrictive statutory
language applied, 46 while Surette concerned a "necessary func-
tion": the school board's statutory duty to provide transportation
for children receiving public instruction. Consequently, a negligent
breach of that duty could give rise to liability to the extent of pol-
icy coverage.'7
This "necessary function" analysis was transformed into a seem-
ingly illogical test by the Third District Court of Appeal in
McPhee v. Dade County.48 In McPhee, a woman drowned at a
county park. The court held that the drowning was caused by the
decedent's own negligence, and thus affirmed the trial court's sum-
mary judgment for the defendant. The court followed its affirma-
tion with a discussion in dicta of the applicability of section
455.06. 4' After citing Arnold and Valdez for the proposition that
the statute should be strictly construed, the court concentrated on
the "necessary function" analysis. According to the McPhee court,
"[a] governmental function is necessary; a proprietary function,
41. Id. at 839.
42. Id.
43. 323 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
44. Ostrow & Lowe, Sovereign Immunity, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1297, 1310 (1979).
45. 323 So. 2d at 54. The plaintiff also alleged that the site was not properly marked and
that the child did not have a safe place to stand while awaiting the bus. Id.
46. Id. at 56.
47. Id. at 57.
48. 362 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
49. Id. at 76.
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such as maintaining a recreation area, is not." 0 The court but-
tressed this analysis by pointing out that the statute uses the term
''governmental immunity" rather than "sovereign immunity":
''governmental immunity must be construed to mean immunity for
governmental functions. Such a reading of the statute would be in
harmony with the 'necessary function' language of the statute.""
The court concluded that because the maintenance of a recreation
area is neither necessary nor governmental, section 455.06 was in-
applicable to waive immunity.
This is a questionable construction of the statute. As Judge
Hubbart reminded the court in his concurrence, the governmental/
proprietary dichotomy as originally developed would produce the
opposite result from that reached in this case.62 Traditionally mu-
nicipalities were exposed to liability when performing proprietary,
and not governmental functions. Thus, section 455.06 never was
applicable to proprietary functions since the sovereign never had
any immunity to waive in the first place. He also pointed out that
"contrary to the court's conclusion herein, the term 'governmental
immunity' as used in the statute has no special meaning apart
from the term 'sovereign immunity' because both such terms have
long been used interchangeably in this field of law."'53
Though the McPhee court's interpretation was unique, it did fol-
low the tradition of strict construction. However, the enactment in
1973 of section 768.28, Florida Statutes, broadly waiving sovereign
immunity, quite naturally affected future construction of section
286.28. A brief look at several major cases interpreting section
768.28 provides background for an analysis of more recent section
286.28 cases.
50. Id. at 80 (emphasis added). Earlier in the opinion the court discussed at length the
differences between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions, and the difference be-
tween county and municipal functions. The court concluded that a county is immune from
suit whether its actions are governmental or proprietary in nature. Id. at 76-78. In Florida,
municipalities historically had sovereign immunity only when performing governmental and
not proprietary functions. See generally Ostrow & Lowe, supra note 44, at 1304-06 (1979).
51. McPhee, 362 So. 2d at 80. Two years earlier, the court held that operation of the
Florida Keys Aquaduct Authority is a governmental function and could be liable under sec-
tion 455.06 for negligence resulting in damage to the plaintiff's property. Jolly v. Insurance
Co. of North America, 331 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
52. McPhee, 362 So. 2d at 81 (Hubbart, J., concurring). See also Ostrow & Lowe, supra
note 44, at 1304-06.
53. McPhee, 362 So. 2d at 81 (Hubbart, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Judge Hub-
bart would reach the same result by a strict reading of the Florida Supreme Court's decision
in Arnold. He contended that the statute allows insurance coverage only for property "spe-
cifically enumerated in the statute." Id.
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III. SECTION 768.28 AND THE Commecial Carrier DOCTRINE
The seminal case construing the scope of the waiver of sovereign
immunity in section 768.28, Florida Statutes, is Commercial Car-
rier Corp. v. Indian River County.5 4 Section 768.28(1) provides
that sovereign immunity is waived "for liability for torts, but only
to the extent specified in this act."'55 It includes:
[aictions at law against the state or any of its agencies or subdivi-
sions to recover damages in tort for money damages against the
state or its agencies or subdivisions for injury or loss of property,
personal injury, or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the agency or subdivision while
acting within the scope of his office or employment under circum-
stances in which the state or such agency or subdivision, if a pri-
vate person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the general laws of this state.56
Subsection 5 of the statute puts a monetary cap on the amount of
damages recoverable.
The language of the statute is obviously very broad. Neverthe-
less, in Commercial Carrier, the Florida Supreme Court decided,
despite evidence of legislative intent to the contrary, that certain
governmental functions would remain immune.57 The court, refer-
ring to decisions from other jurisdictions, adopted the distinction
between "planning" and "operational" functions of government.58
Its intention was to adopt portions of two foreign decisions: the
analysis in the California decision of Johnson v. State,59 and "the
preliminary test iterated in [the Washington Supreme Court case
of] Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State." 0 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Johnson reached the planning/operational
distinction in an attempt to identify certain "discretionary" func-
tions of government that should not be considered tortious.6 1 The
Florida Supreme Court then stated that discretionary acts should
54. 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
55. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1) (1985).
56. Id.
57. Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1022.
58. Id.
59. 69 Cal. 2d 782, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352 (Cal. 1968).
60. 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965).
61. Commerical Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1022.
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be insulated from liability for public policy reasons and quoted Ev-
angelical United:2
The reason most frequently assigned is that in any organized soci-
ety there must be room for basic governmental policy decision
and the implementation thereof, unhampered by the threat or
fear of sovereign tort liability, or, as stated by one writer "Liabil-
ity cannot be imposed when condemnation of the acts or omis-
sions relied upon necessarily brings into question the propriety of
governmental objectives or programs or the decision of one who,
with the authority to do so, determined that the acts or omissions
involved should occur or that the risk which eventuated should be
encountered for the advancement of governmental objectives."63
Thus, the planning/operational dichotomy was adopted in Florida.
Subsequently in Department of Transportation v. Neilson," the
court explained its holding in Commercial Carrier:
Justice Sundberg, in a thorough analysis of the law in this area,
distinguished between that part of the sovereign immunity doc-
trine involving negligent tortious conduct waived by section
768.28, Florida Statutes (1977), and that part of the sovereign im-
munity doctrine identified at times as official or governmental im-
munity not waived by the statute. In the latter, absolute immu-
nity attaches to "policy-making, planning, or judgmental
governmental functions." The underlying premise for this immu-
nity is that it cannot be tortious conduct for a government to gov-
ern. Our decision recognized that there are areas inherent in the
act of governing which cannot be subject to suit and scrutiny by
judge or jury without violating the separation of powers
doctrine.6 5
The theory behind this judicially-created restriction is that when
government is governing it cannot commit a tort. Otherwise, the
courts would be omnipotent overseers of all governmental deci-
sions, including those uniquely within the province of the other
branches.
However, government often does more than just govern, stepping
out of "planning" and moving into "operations." Then the judici-
62. Id. at 1019.
63. Evangelical United, 67 Wash. 2d at 254, 407 P.2d at 444 (quoting Peck, The Federal
Tort Claims Act, 31 WASH. L. REv. 207 (1956)).
64. 419 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1982).
65. Id. at 1075 (citation omitted).
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ary is charged with addressing any tortious conduct attributable to
the government. When the legislature authorized tort actions
against the government, it did so for "operational-level" conduct.
Thus section 768.28 "created no new causes of action, but merely
eliminated the immunity which prevented recovery for existing
common law torts committed by the government." 6
Section 768.28, when combined with its unique judicial interpre-
tation, mandated a reconsideration of section 286.28. The following
section details the supreme court's interpretation of the two stat-
utes together.
IV. AN OVERALL STATUTORY SCHEME
In reaching its decision in Avallone v. Board of County Commis-
sioners,67 the Florida Supreme Court said it relied on Ingraham v.
Dade County School Board." In Ingraham, an action was brought
on behalf of a student injured during a physical education class. A
$1,000,000 settlement was reached representing the extent of the
school board's liability coverage.6 9 The school board argued that
attorney's fees should be limited to twenty-five percent of the
award, as provided in section 768.28(8), Florida Statutes."0 The
trial court held that this limitation applied only to the first $50,000
of the settlement since that amount represented the statutory cap
restriction on the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 768.28.71
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal held that the fee
limitation applied to the entire settlement.72 Upon certification,
the Florida Supreme Court agreed. While section 768.28 "totally
revised the area of sovereign immunity," it specifically left the pro-
visions of section 286.28 intact. 3 The court pointed to the lan-
guage of section 768.28(10) which states that, "[laws allowing the
state or its agencies or subdivisions to buy insurance are still in
force and effect and are not restricted in any way by the terms of
66. Trianon Park Condominium Assoc. v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912, 914 (Fla.
1985).
67. 493 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 1986).
68. Ingraham, 450 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1984).
69. Id. at 848.
70. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(8)(1981) provides: "No attorney may charge, demand, receive, or
collect, for services rendered, fees in excess of 25 percent of any judgment or settlement."
71. The statute was subsequently amended, increasing the cap to $100,000. See 1981 Fla.
Laws 81-317.
72. Dade County School Bd. v. Ingraham, 428 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), aff'd, 450
So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1984).
73. Ingraham, 450 So. 2d at 849.
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this act."' 7' This language, it reasoned, brought section 286.28 into
the overall legislative scheme regarding the waiver of sovereign im-
munity.75 Since the only language in this unitary scheme concern-
ing attorney's fees is found in section 768.28(8), its provisions con-
trolled in situations where a political subdivision purchases
insurance as provided in section 286.28. Furthermore, "[tihe
[twenty-five percent] limitation on attorney's fees relates to any
judgment or settlement and therefore applies to all situations in-
volving waiver of sovereign immunity regardless of the source of
payment."7 6
Although decided prior to the supreme court's ruling in Ingra-
ham, two district court decisions used similar reasoning. In Bur-
kett v. Calhoun County,7 7 the First District Court of Appeal held
that the notice requirement of section 768.28(6)78 applied to an ac-
tion against a political subdivision regardless of whether liability
insurance had been purchased pursuant to section 286.28. The
court relied in part upon the Third District's finding in Ingraham
that section 768.28 was intended to be a "complete overhaul" of
sovereign immunity law.7 9 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
cited both of these cases in reaching an identical holding in
Mrowczynski v. Vizenthal.s°
The Ingraham decision seemed to affirm what three of the dis-
trict courts already viewed as the role of section 286.28. It was not
repealed, but because section 768.28 "totally revised the area of
sovereign immunity," the old section simply became part of a uni-
tary scheme.81 The same scheme applies irrespective of the subject
matter of the litigation. This gives Florida a consistent and unified
body of law on sovereign immunity.
An earlier Florida Supreme Court decision, Harrison v. Es-
cambia County School Board,82 is somewhat troubling. Harrison
involved a damages action against a school board for the death of a
74. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(10) (1985).
75. Ingraham, 450 So. 2d at 849.
76. Id. (emphasis in original).
77. 441 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
78. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(6) (1985) requires, as a prerequisite for bringing an action against
a political subdivision, that the claimant give notice "in writing to the appropriate agency,
and also, except as to any claim against a municipality, [present] such claim in writing to
the Department of Insurance, within [three] years after such claim accrues and the Depart-
ment of Insurance or the appropriate agency denies the claim in writing."
79. Burkett, 441 So. 2d at 1109.
80. 445 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
81. Ingraham, 450 So. 2d at 849.
82. 434 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1983).
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child run down by a motorist while walking to a bus stop. 3 The
amended complaint alleged that, "Defendant, ESCAMBIA
COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, is a political subdivision of the State
of Florida and has waived sovereign immunity pursuant to Sec.
455.06 and Sec. 768.28, Fla. Stat. (1977). ''84 The trial court dis-
missed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, and the
First District affirmed."
On certification to the Florida Supreme Court, petitioner argued
that the school board had violated section 234.112, Florida Stat-
utes (1977), which required the "establish[ment of] school bus
stops as necessary at the most reasonably safe location available." 86
The supreme court agreed with the First District Court that deter-
mining locations for school bus stops is a planning-level decision,
immune from liability under Commercial Carrier.8 7 The court did
not address whether immunity was waived pursuant to section
455.06, even though it was charged in the petitioner's amended
complaint. After Harrison, the planning/operational dichotomy ap-
peared still firmly implanted in the overall legislative scheme of
sovereign immunity waiver.
So assumed the Third District Court when, a year after the su-
preme court's decision in Ingraham, it was presented with Aval-
lone. The planning/operational dichotomy outlined in Commercial
Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, although not specifically ad-
dressed in either statute, was now well-established. The court
noted: "[W]e find nothing in section 286.28 that overcomes or al-
ters the absolute immunity which attaches to 'planning level' activ-
ities of government." 88 Thus, the supreme court's reversal and ex-
press reliance on Ingraham appears incongruous on its face.
V. CONCLUSION
In Avallone, the Florida Supreme Court answered an important
question with regard to governmental liability in Florida. In so do-
ing, however, it appeared to be questioning its own credibility.
Where the legislature, in section 768.28, Florida Statutes, said "the
83. Id. at 317.
84. Id. at 318 n.2.
85 Harrison v. Escambia County School Bd., 419 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), aff'd,
434 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1983).
86. FLA. STAT. § 234.112 (1977).
87. Harrison, 434 So. 2d at 320.
88. Avallone v. Board of County Comm'rs, 467 So. 2d 826, 827 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985),
rev'd, 493 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 1986).
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state . . . hereby waives sovereign immunity for liability for
torts,"' 9 the court in Commercial Carrier found that it waived im-
munity only for operational activity and not for planning activity.
As the court explained in Department of Transportation v. Neil-
son,90 "it cannot be tortious activity for a government to govern,"91
and governing is "planning-level" activity.
Despite this, in Avallone the court took a statute with similar
"waiver" language 2 and interpreted it to abolish immunity for all
levels of governmental activity. Furthermore, this was a statute the
court had historically strictly construed. If the commission of a
tort is required to trigger its waiver, and planning-level activity is
not tortious, how does the statute come into play?
The essence of Commercial Carrier was not judicial legislation
but a recognition of the separation of powers element in the grand
old scheme of sovereign immunity. The court in Commercial Car-
rier pointed out that when sovereign immunity is abolished, the
separation of powers element remains. Yet, with regard to section
286.28, the court in Avallone tells us this element was also
abolished.
However, Commercial Carrier has been criticized for producing
confusion and uncertainty when applied to new and varied fact sit-
uations.93 Perhaps the court's refusal to cast section 286.28 into the
planning/operational morass was wise. Indeed, with all due defer-
ence to Chief Justice McDonald, from a practical standpoint, the
court's ruling created order out of relative chaos.9"
89. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1) (1985).
90. Neilson, 419 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1982).
91. Id. at 1075.
92. Compare FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1) (1985) ("the state ... hereby waives sovereign im-
munity for liability for torts") with FLA. STAT. § 286.28(2) (1985) ("the insurer shall not be
entitled to the benefit of the defense of governmental immunity").
93. See, e.g., Comment, The Florida Supreme Court's View of State Sovereign Immu-
nity: An Exercise in Confusion Producing Restrictive Results, 15 ST'SON L. REV. 831
(1986); Note, Sovereign Immunity Trilogy: Commercial Carrier Revisted But Not Refined,
10 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 702 (1983).
94. Cf. Avallone v. Board of County Comm'rs, 493 So. 2d 1002, 1008 (Fla. 1986) (McDon-
ald, C.J., dissenting) ("the majority's ruling creates chaos out of relative order").
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